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The Captive Medical Malpractice Insurance
Company Alternative
James A. Christopherson*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, health care providers, including hospitals,
health maintenance organizations, and physician practice
groups, have faced steadily rising medical malpractice premi-
ums, which have led them to seek alternative sources apart from
the traditional policies and services provided by large, independ-
ent, commercial insurance companies. One alternative of in-
creasing popularity is the captive medical malpractice insurance
company ("captive"). Rather than purchasing insurance from
an independent insurance company, the insured can create a
subsidiary or sister corporation, the captive, to act as a funding
vehicle for the insured (the captive's owner(s) or its affiliate(s))
by assuming some or all of the owner's risk of financial liability
for medical malpractice either through direct insurance or
reinsurance.
The relationship between an insured and its captive is distin-
guished by the high degree of control the insured can exercise
over its insurer. As the captive's owner, the insured can be di-
rectly involved in major decisions made by the captive regarding
underwriting, investment policies, claims management, and
quality improvement. Direct involvement with these issues as
well as with the captive's ongoing performance often means that
the insured can reduce its risk-funding costs. Indeed, reducing
insurance costs by effectively managing risks and by eliminating
much of the overhead carried by an independent insurance com-
pany is what makes forming a captive an attractive option for
many health care providers.
* Mr. Christopherson is a member of the law firm of Dingeman, Dancer & Chris-
topherson, P.L.C., in Traverse City, Michigan. He represents physician organizations,
physician practice groups, management service organizations, and other health care
providers and organizations advising them on a variety of issues. Mr. Christopherson
received his undergraduate Bachelor of Arts, magna cum laude, from Michigan State
University, and Doctor of Jurisprudence, cum laude, from Wayne State University
Law School. He is a member of the National Health Lawyers Association and the
American Academy of Healthcare Attorneys.
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Beyond reducing premiums and providing protection from
premium fluctuations, there are several other reasons health
care providers may decide to form a captive:
* the insured(s) can control the investment of premium in-
come and capital, which can reduce premium costs;
* the captive can design loss prevention and claims handling
programs for medical malpractice claims, a highly specialized
area (including a unified legal defense among multiple
defendants);
* the captive can provide broader coverage than may be
available in the commercial insurance market (or for some risks
the only coverage); and
* the captive can access the reinsurance market.
A practitioner who attempts to form a captive for a health
care provider must be aware of many issues.1 An extremely sig-
nificant issue is the tax treatment of the premiums the insured
pays to its captive: a for-profit insured must be able to deduct as
business expenses the premiums it pays its captive,2 and not
have them treated as nondeductible loss reserves. The recent
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Malone & Hyde, Inc.
v. Commissioner3 highlights some of the tax traps that await the
unwary practitioner when forming a captive. While it is beyond
the scope of this article to describe in detail the tax advantages
and disadvantages of a captive, it will discuss Malone & Hyde
and, more generally, the Internal Revenue Code's treatment of
corporate insurance, providing an overview in this area.
In addition, a practitioner must consider the tradeoffs in-
volved in domiciling the captive. Offshore domiciles are ex-
tremely popular because of the greatly reduced regulatory
1. For more guidance, see Donald A. Winslow, Tax Avoidance and the Definition
of Insurance: The Continuing Examination of Captive Insurance Companies, 40 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 79 (1990); Joseph C. Safar, When Federal Tax Law Frustrates Policy:
The Confused Rules Governing the Deductibility of Captive Insurance Premiums, 34
Duo. L. REV. 105 (1995); Julie A. Roin, United They Stand, Divided They Fall: Public
Choice Theory and the Tax Code, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 62 (1988); Note, Revenue Rule
77-316 and Carnation Co. v. Commissioner: An Analysis of the Attack on Captive
Offshore Insurance Companies, 2 VA. TAx REV. 111 (1982); Theodore D. Moskowitz
& Walter A. Effross, Turning Back the Tide of Director and Office Liability, 23 SETON
HALL L. REV. 897 (1993); Stuart R. Singer, When the Internal Revenue Service Abuses
the System: Captive Insurance Companies and the Delusion of the Economic Family,
10 VA. TAX REV. 113 (1990); William B. Barker, Federal Income Taxation and Captive
Insurance, 6 VA. TAX REV. 267 (1986).
2. See generally Winslow, supra note 1. This issue is not important to the tax-
exempt organization.
3. 62 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 1995).
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burden, lower capitalization requirements, and certain federal
tax advantages for tax-exempt organizations. This article will
discuss the reasons for forming a captive medical malpractice
insurance company, the different types of captives, and the due
diligence considerations that the practitioner will face when
forming a captive.
I. REASONS TO FORM A CAPTIVE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE COMPANY
Most entities looking at the possibility of forming a captive do
so because they believe that they can reduce risk-funding costs.
There are two primary ways a captive can reduce premiums.
First, a captive should be able to minimize the administrative
costs (including taxes) and eliminate the profit margins included
in a commercial insurance company's premium. Second, a cap-
tive may be able to reduce loss exposures and manage claims
more effectively than a commercial insurer. One single princi-
ple underlies the advantages a captive may afford its founders:
by directly aligning the policyholders' economic interests with
the economic interests of the captive's owners/decision makers,
a more favorable financial outcome is likely. Further, in the
health care context, it can be expected that these economic con-
siderations will result in improved patient care.
The reduction of commercial insurance company overhead
alone should result in some lowering of premiums. However, in
order to reduce premiums further, the captive must become an
effective vehicle for reducing loss exposures and managing
claims. Therefore, any entity looking at the formation of a cap-
tive should closely examine its own loss history. For example,
there can be wide swings in profits and losses from year to year
because of the potential for large verdicts (and settlements) in
medical malpractice lawsuits. Health care organizations consid-
ering whether to form a captive must look very closely at the
amount of risk to be retained in the captive relative to obtaining
commercial excess or reinsurance coverage for higher-exposure
layers.
Another advantage to forming a captive is directing invest-
ments and retaining income on invested premium and capital
until claims and loss adjustment expenses are actually paid.
While captives often are formed with a relatively small amount
of capital, loss reserves typically are quite large and are invested
for the lengthy amount of time it takes to resolve the medical
3
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malpractice claims. This investment income can be used to re-
duce future premiums.
While the low capitalization required for a captive may be
seen as an advantage, in general a practitioner should advise a
client against undercapitalizing the captive. An undercapital-
ized captive may not provide an adequate "cushion" should pre-
miums fail to cover claims and adjustment expenses. A properly
capitalized captive may avoid the drastic consequences of a
court declaring the captive a sham corporation, as did the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Malone & Hyde, Inc. v.
Commissioner.4
Another reason a health care entity might consider forming a
captive is to use its expertise in handling medical malpractice
claims. Many commercial insurance companies writing medical
malpractice insurance also write other lines of insurance. By
having a captive formed expressly to provide medical malprac-
tice insurance for its owners and perhaps other closely related
and economically interested parties (such as medical staff physi-
cians), the captive can handle its claims more efficiently, which
can ultimately result in smaller or fewer claims being made.
Smaller and fewer claims result in increased profits for the cap-
tive or, in the alternative, reduced premiums to the policyhold-
ers/owners.
Captives and their owners may also benefit from being able to
access the reinsurance market. Many captives, when they are
initially formed, do not have the financial ability to take on in-
termediate layers of risk, much less catastrophic layers of risk.
So captives often contract with reinsurance companies to as-
sume a portion of the risk. For example, a captive may deter-
mine that it cannot remain economically viable if it has to pay
claims aggregating over $500,000 in a particular year. The cap-
tive could then cede to a commercial reinsurer aggregate annual
losses in excess of $500,000 by entering into a reinsurance con-
tract (often called a reinsurance treaty). The captive would then
pay the reinsurer a portion of its gross written premium in ex-
change for the reinsurer's covering the specified portion of the
risk.
By gaining all of these advantages, the captive can provide
coverage to meet the insured's very particular needs. In some
instances, the captive is the only means of coverage, as commer-
4. 62 F.3d at 841. See infra section 1I(B).
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cial insurers may be unwilling to insure certain high-risk activi-
ties of the health care provider.
II. TAX CONSIDERATIONS
Most offshore domiciles do not impose income or other taxes
on captives. While onshore or offshore captives or their for-
profit owners generally will pay to the United States govern-
ment a federal income tax on investment and underwriting in-
come, the offshore captive itself can avoid federal income tax as
long as it does not engage in United States trade or business. 5 A
tax-exempt organization, such as a not-for-profit hospital, how-
ever, will not be concerned with this issue.6 Currently, tax-ex-
empt shareholders of an offshore captive are not taxable
because "subpart F" income attributed to them is treated as a
dividend excludible from "unrelated business taxable income."7
Depending on what version of tax legislation Congress passes in
1996, however, this latter benefit may be reduced or eliminated.
It is beyond the scope of this article to describe completely
the tax advantages and disadvantages of a captive.8 As a gen-
eral rule, taxable policyholders of a captive will attempt to have
premiums treated as deductible business expenses. 9 However,
tax-exempt policyholders, such as many health care providers,
are indifferent to tax deductibility, but can benefit in other ways.
Two key issues facing captives with taxable owners are: (1)
whether the owners can deduct the premiums paid to the cap-
tives as they would commercial insurance premiums, and (2)
5. See Roin, supra note 1.
6. In Florida Hosp. Trust Fund v. Commissioner, 71 F.3d 808 (11th Cir. 1996), the
court held that a trust fund formed to pool the risk of tax-exempt health care entities
is not itself tax exempt. "[T]he member hospitals are not 'self-insuring' themselves
through these trusts .... Neither are they 'purchasing' insurance on a group basis
through these trusts. What these member hospitals are doing is providing insurance
to each other, on a reciprocal basis, using trust vehicles as their chosen method of
operation. Each member insures-each is liable for the losses." Id. at 812. The court
held the trust funds did not qualify for tax-exempt status under section 501(e)(1)(A).
While the tax commissioner had also applied section 501(m) (denial of tax exemption
for providing commercial-type insurance) to preclude exemption, the court of appeals
never reached that alternative holding.
7. See Comm. on Foreign Activities of U.S. Taxpayers, Am. Bar Ass'n, Annual
Report. Important Developments During the Year, 44 TAx LAW. 1287 (1991) (citing
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-24-026 (Mar. 15, 1990)).
8. For taxable owners of a captive, however, most federal tax advantages of a
captive were eliminated by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
9. See generally Winslow, supra note 1.
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whether they will in fact be treated as separate entities from
their owners.
A. The Definition of Insurance Under the Tax Law
Businesses other than insurance companies cannot deduct
business expenses until the expenses are actually paid or ac-
crued. Under section 832 of the Internal Revenue Code, a re-
serve established for losses is deductible only if the taxpayer
actually issues policies of "insurance" as that term is interpreted
by the tax law. If a noninsurance business simply sets up a re-
serve for losses, it cannot deduct the reserve from income. 10
Therefore, a taxable captive owner/policyholder can take advan-
tage of this deduction only if the captive issues "policies of in-
surance." To the contrary, captives formed by tax-exempt
organizations generally prefer not to be defined as "insurance
companies" because (1) no federal excise tax will be due, (2)
state insurance code regulatory violations may be avoided, and
(3) tax-exempt organizations do not need to deduct premium
payments. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) often has taken
aggressive positions against captives, claiming that they are not
really issuing insurance and therefore are not insurance compa-
nies. Whether the courts accept the IRS's position is deter-
mined by the legal definition of "insurance" as the term has
been defined by case law.
The test for defining an insurance transaction, as set forth by
the United States Supreme Court in Helvering v. Le Gierse,"
requires that the transaction involve both "risk shifting" and
"risk distribution." In Le Gierse, the taxpayer concurrently
purchased a life insurance policy and an annuity from a com-
mercial insurance company. The "premiums" and annuity pay-
ments were structured as an offset so that the insured, and not
the insurance company, retained all the risk upon her death. As
a result, the insured did not shift risk to the insurer. The
Supreme Court found that no insurance existed and, in the pro-
cess, defined for the first time what constitutes insurance:
Historically and commonly insurance involves risk-shifting and
risk-distributing. That life insurance is desirable from an eco-
nomic and social standpoint as a device to shift and distribute
risk of loss from premature death is unquestionable. That
10. See Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 279, 280 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1979).
11. 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
[Vol. 5
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these elements of risk-shifting and risk-distributing are essen-
tial to a life insurance contract is agreed by courts and
commentators.
12
Subsequently, courts have struggled with the issue of whether
insurance premiums paid to a wholly owned subsidiary can be
deducted, or whether they are more like payments made to a
self-insurance reserve. To answer this question, courts have at-
tempted to define insurance and determine how that definition
applies to captives in a variety of factual situations.
1. The IRS Argues for the Economic Family Approach, but
Courts Do Not Adopt It
The IRS, in support of its aggressive position against captives,
advanced in 1977 the "economic family" approach: "[T]he insur-
ing parent corporation and its domestic subsidiaries, and the
wholly owned 'insurance' subsidiary, though separate corporate
entities, represent one economic family with the result that
those who bear the ultimate economic burden of loss are the
same persons who suffer the loss.' ' 13 In 1988, the IRS took the
position that, based on its economic family theory, no amount of
outside insurance business written by a captive creates risk shift-
ing from the parent or its subsidiaries to the captive. 4 The
IRS's position was explained in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Commissioner:
According to the Commissioner, "insurance" from a subsidi-
ary is self-insurance by another name. Moving funds from one
pocket to another does nothing, even if the pocket is sepa-
rately incorporated. If Subsidiary pays out a dollar, Parent
loses the same dollar. Nothing depends on whether Subsidiary
has other customers; there is still a one-to-one correspondence
between its payments and Parent's wealth.1 5
The IRS's economic family approach is hard to reconcile with
the well-established doctrine that the tax law respects separate
corporate forms and thereby treats a subsidiary and its parent as
separate legal entities. 6 The courts uniformly have rejected the
IRS's "economic family" approach. 7 For example, in
12. Id. at 539.
13. Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 55. See Barker, supra note 1, at 282; Note,
Revenue Rule 77-316, supra note 1, at 125-29. See generally Singer, supra note 1.
14. Rev. Rul. 88-72, 1988-2 C.B. 31, 32.
15. 972 F.2d 858, 861 (7th Cir. 1992).
16. See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943).
17. See Barker, supra note 1; Singer, supra note 1.
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AMERCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit stated:
"[Other] courts have ... noted [the economic family theory's]
difficulties and have not followed it .... We see no reason to
follow it now."' 8
2. Some Courts Agree With the IRS's Position That Captives
May Not Be Shifting Risk
While the economic family approach has been widely re-
jected, courts will look at the degree to which the captive does
insurance business unrelated to the parent's business to deter-
mine if the parent has in fact shifted or distributed risk. Thus,
while the Tax Court and some courts of appeal have accepted
the IRS's position that single-parent captives are only providing
self-insurance, captives with substantial outside business will be
deemed in the insurance business for tax purposes. For exam-
ple, in Harper Group v. Commissioner,19 the unrelated business
of the captive varied between twenty-nine and thirty-three per-
cent; the Ninth Circuit held that the Tax Court did not err in
finding this amount of unrelated business as demonstrating the
existence of true insurance. The Harper court relied on
AMERCO,20 where the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's
finding that there was sufficient unrelated business (fifty-two to
seventy-four percent) to create a true risk pool and to generate
risk shifting. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Commissioner,2' the
Seventh Circuit allowed the deduction when 99.75% of the sub-
sidiary's business was outside insurance business. In Beech Air-
craft Corp. v. United States,2 2 the Tenth Circuit held that only
one-half of one percent of unrelated business did not involve
risk shifting, and, therefore, the transactions did not create true
insurance. It is obvious that the issue of whether there is true
"risk shifting" must be closely examined by any health care en-
tity that decides to establish a captive.
B. Premium Deductibility and the Sham Corporation
Counsel should be aware of a highly significant captive case in
which the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
18. 979 F.2d 162, 166 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 972 F.2d 858, 861 (7th Cir. 1992). See also Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co.
v. United States, 24 CI. Ct. 714, 729 (1991).
19. 979 F.2d 1341, 1342 (9th Cir. 1992).
20. 979 F.2d at 168.
21. 972 F.2d 858, 863-64 (7th Cir. 1992).
22. 797 F.2d 920, 922 (10th Cir. 1986).
[Vol. 5
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refused to recognize the captive as a distinct corporate entity.23
Malone & Hyde established a wholly owned Bermuda insurance
subsidiary, Eastland Insurance, Ltd. ("Eastland"), to provide
workers' compensation and liability coverage for Malone &
Hyde and its subsidiaries. Eastland's sole asset was its initial
capital of $120,000, which met the minimum requirements of
Bermuda law. Northwestern National Insurance Company
("Northwestern") served as Malone & Hyde's primary insurer
(sometimes referred to as its "fronting" company) to issue the
workers' compensation policies. Northwestern and Eastland en-
tered into a reinsurance agreement pursuant to which Eastland
assumed the majority of the risks of Malone & Hyde and its
subsidiaries, which was Eastland's sole activity. Specifically,
Northwestern reinsured the first $150,000 of coverage per claim
with Eastland. Eastland provided Northwestern with an irrevo-
cable standby letter of credit in the amount of $250,000 to cover
any amounts unpaid under the reinsurance agreement. Subse-
quently, Eastland increased its letter of credit to Northwestern
to $600,000. Malone & Hyde, as the parent of the captive, exe-
cuted a hold harmless agreement in favor of Northwestern,
agreeing to indemnify Northwestern against any liability to the
extent Eastland defaulted on its obligations as Northwestern's
reinsurer.
Malone & Hyde paid Northwestern $2,613,354 in insurance
premiums in 1979 and $3,047,507 in 1980. Northwestern paid
Eastland reinsurance premiums of $1,982,369 in 1979 and
$2,343,648 in 1980. Malone & Hyde claimed federal income tax
deductions for the entire insurance premium it paid to North-
western. The IRS disallowed that portion of premiums paid by
Malone & Hyde to Northwestern that Northwestern in turn paid
to Eastland as reinsurance premiums.
The issue before the United States Tax Court was whether
Malone & Hyde was entitled to deduct as an ordinary and nec-
essary business expense under section 162 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code24 the portion of the premiums that Malone & Hyde
paid to Northwestern that were in turn paid by Northwestern to
Eastland as reinsurance premiums. The Tax Court ruled that
23. Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 1995).
24. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1994).
129
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Malone & Hyde could deduct these portions,25 and the IRS
appealed.
The Sixth Circuit began its inquiry by noting that "premiums
paid by a business for [commercial] insurance are considered de-
ductible business expenses ... [but] sums set aside for the pay-
ment of anticipated losses through reserves or ... as a plan for
self-insurance, are not deductible business expenses. ' 26 The
Sixth Circuit relied upon Helvering v. Le Gierse,27 stating that
"unless [a] transaction involves both 'risk shifting' and 'risk dis-
tribution,' it is not an insurance transaction for purposes of the
Internal Revenue Code. 28 Since the IRS did not contest the
element of risk distribution, the issue before the Sixth Circuit
was whether or not there was risk shifting.29
The Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court, holding that the
payments made by Malone & Hyde were not deductible. 30 Ini-
tially, the court found that the Tax Court should have first deter-
mined whether the premium Malone & Hyde paid to Eastland
was "for a legitimate business purpose or whether the captive
was in fact a sham corporation. ' 31 The Sixth Circuit found that
Eastland was a sham corporation: "an undercapitalized foreign
insurance captive that is propped-up by guarantees of the parent
corporation. ' 32 Thus, "premiums" paid by the parent to the
sham corporation are not deductible expenses under section
162(a).
The Malone & Hyde court extensively discussed and distin-
guished Humana Inc. v. Commissioner,33 which, unlike Malone
& Hyde, involved a captive organized to provide medical mal-
practice insurance. Humana and its numerous wholly owned
subsidiaries operated for-profit hospitals in the United States
and abroad. When insurance coverage for these hospitals had
been canceled, Humana formed as its wholly owned subsidiary
Healthcare Indemnity, Inc. (HCI), a Colorado captive capital-
ized with $1,000,000 that provided insurance coverage exclu-
sively to Humana and its subsidiaries. Humana claimed the
25. Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1551, 1562 (1993),
rev'd, 62 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 1995).
26. 62 F.3d at 838.
27. 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
28. 62 F.3d at 838 (citing Helvering, 312 U.S. at 539).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 843.
31. Id. at 840.
32. Id.
33. 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989).
[Vol. 5
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aggregate amounts paid to HCI as an ordinary and necessary
business expense deduction. The IRS denied the deduction and
Humana filed suit in the Tax Court, which upheld the IRS's de-
termination.34 The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, finding (a)
that payments made by Humana to HCI for Humana's own cov-
erage did not constitute deductible insurance premiums,35 but
(b) that payments made to HCI for coverage provided to
Humana's subsidiaries were deductible business expenses be-
cause "risk shifting" between and among Humana's numerous
subsidiaries existed under the Le Gierse test.36
The factual situation in Humana was distinguishable from that
in Malone & Hyde for the following reasons. First, Humana was
unable to replace its coverage when its insurance was canceled;
Malone & Hyde had no problem obtaining insurance. Second,
Humana formed HCI as a fully capitalized insurer under Colo-
rado law subject to that state's regulatory control; Eastland was
operating on the thin minimum capitalization requirements
under Bermuda law. There was nothing in the record to show
what regulation Bermuda exercised over captive insurers.
Third, on two occasions, Malone & Hyde furnished Northwest-
ern with hold harmless agreements; there were no parental
guarantees in the Humana case.
The Sixth Circuit in Malone & Hyde concluded that
[i]f Humana's scheme had involved a thinly capitalized.., in-
surance company that ended up with a large portion of the
premiums paid to a commercial insurance company as primary
insurer, and had included a hold harmless agreement from
Humana indemnifying the unrelated insurer against all liabil-
ity, we believe the result in Humana would have been
different.38
A practitioner considering forming a captive must be very
careful when relying upon the Humana case. Humana adopted
the approach used in Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner,39
where the Court of Appeals looked only to the effect of a claim
on the insured's assets to determine whether the party shifted its
risk. 0 However, courts reviewing this issue have not reached a
34. Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 197, 214 (1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989).
35. 881 F.2d at 251.
36. Id. at 252.
37. Malone & Hyde, 62 F.3d at 840-41.
38. Id. at 842.
39. 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987).
40. Id. at 1305.
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consensus on any one approach. 41 The Humana holding is pre-
mised on the theory that there is no direct connection between a
loss sustained by a captive and the affiliates of a parent.42 The
Sixth Circuit refused to look to the parent to determine whether
a subsidiary shifted its risk of loss since this treats the parent and
the subsidiary as one economic unit;43 it relied upon the United
States Supreme Court case of Moline Properties, Inc. v. Com-
missioner 4 for the proposition that a court should not disregard
the separate legal status of a company where it has a valid busi-
ness purpose and corporate formalities are observed. The Sixth
Circuit in Humana found that Humana's use of a Colorado cap-
tive insurance company was not a sham and that it served a le-
gitimate business purpose.45
The dilemma facing a practitioner after the Malone & Hyde
decision is what to do to eliminate the risk of having the IRS
treat the captive as a sham and thereby disallow a tax deduction.
The lessons of Malone & Hyde are as follows:
1. Counsel should advise the client to capitalize the captive
with more than the minimum capitalization requirements of the
offshore jurisdiction.
2. The parent company and the reinsurer should closely ex-
amine the issue of whether the parent should enter into a hold
harmless or parental guaranty agreement.
3. The parent and captive should adhere to corporate "for-
malities" to substantiate that in fact the captive operates as a
separate legal entity from the parent.
4. Counsel should be prepared to develop fully the court
record with regard to the offshore jurisdiction's extensive regu-
latory scheme with regard to the captive.46
III. PLACE OF DOMICILE
Captive medical malpractice insurance companies may be
domiciled in the United States or offshore. Most captives are
formed offshore because (1) many offshore domiciles require a
41. Safar, supra note 1, at 107-09; Winslow, supra note 1, at 81.
42. 881 F.2d 247, 252 (6th Cir. 1989).
43. Id. at 256.
44. 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943).
45. 881 F.2d at 253.
46. In Malone & Hyde, the record was devoid of any reference to the degree of
regulation that could have been exercised under Bermuda law. If the record had been
fully developed so as to disclose Bermuda's extensive regulatory scheme, the Sixth
Circuit might have reached a different result.
[Vol. 5
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lower level of capitalization, (2) the captive can avoid the bur-
densome reporting requirements and regulations imposed by
state insurance regulators, and (3) the tax-exempt organization
under current law can avoid being taxed under federal law for
unrelated business taxable income, while the taxable owner of
the captive often can avoid state income taxation. 7
The following estimates for 1995 show the popularity of off-
shore captives. Nearly 1850 of the 3400 captives worldwide have
a United States sponsor, approximately seventy percent of
which are formed offshore.4 8  Bermuda boasts the largest
number of captives (1205 of a total 3400), followed by the Cay-
man Islands (360), Guernsey (280), and Vermont (263), the larg-
est onshore domicile. 9
However, onshore domiciles are popular as well. For exam-
ple, a 1995 survey of the fifty-seven insurers licensed under
United States captive/Risk Retention Group 50 regulations shows
thirty (over half) onshore medical malpractice insurance com-
pany captives domiciled in Vermont, with none of the other six
states (Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, and Ten-
nessee) even reaching double digits.5
When forming a captive, the first question posed must be
where the captive will be domiciled.
A. Onshore Domicile
There has been a recent trend in the United States to enact
less restrictive statutes specifically for the formation of captives.
State laws and regulations, however, are still much more oner-
ous52 than the laws and regulations of offshore domiciles.
47. For an in-depth analysis of the tax benefits of offshore captives, see Note,
Revenue Rule 77-316, supra note 1.
48. CAPTIVE INS. Co. REP., Jan. 1995, at 4 (Risk Management Publications, Tow-
ers Perrin Fimancial Services, Stanford, Ct.). See also TOWERS PERRIN FINANCIAL
CENTER, CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY DIRECTORY (1996).
49. CAPTIVE INS. Co. REP., supra note 48.
50. See infra section III(A) (discussion regarding risk retention group regulation).
51. CAPTIVE INS. Co. REP., July 1995, at 5 (Risk Management Publications, Tow-
ers Perrin Financial Services, Stanford, Ct.). But see Governor Howard Dean, Ver-
mont Governor Urges Reconsideration of Budget Proposals, 10 INS. TAX REV. 2701
(1996) (asking President Clinton to reconsider federal measures that could decrease
Vermont's appeal as a captive domicile).
52. But see, e.g., N.Y. S.B. 7582, 219th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1996) (introduced
on May 21, 1996, to exempt from insurance law requirements captives that are formed
and licensed in New York).
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The Liability Risk Retention Act of 198653 has encouraged
associations and other groups to explore forming risk retention
entities within the United States. The Act enables the creation
of two different types of entities. The first is a Risk Retention
Group (RRG), a risk-bearing captive organized under state law.
The second is a Risk Purchasing Group (RPG), an entity that
purchases insurance on behalf of the members of a group from
an unrelated commercial insurance carrier. Unlike an RRG, an
RPG does not require an initial capital investment. The Act
does not permit companies based in offshore jurisdictions to
qualify as either an RRG or an RPG 4
Under the Liability Risk Retention Act, businesses or persons
with similar types of risk may form an RRG to insure against
their liability exposures. The RRG will be regulated primarily
by the domiciliary state. The Act in large part preempts the
authority of nondomiciliary states to license and regulate
RRGs.56 Specifically, an RRG
is exempt from any State law, rule, regulation, or order to the
extent that such a law, rule, regulation, or order would . . .
make unlawful, or regulate, directly or indirectly, the opera-
tion of a risk retention group except that the jurisdiction in
which it is chartered may regulate the formation and operation
of such a group .... 51
There are exceptions to this broad preemptory language. Non-
domiciliary states may, among other things:
1. Tax business written by an RRG in the domiciliary state.
2. Require that the RRG comply with the nondomiciliary
state's unfair claims and deceptive trade practice laws.
3. Require that the policies issued by the RRG contain a no-
tice to the insured that the nondomiciliary state's insurance laws
do not apply and state insurance insolvency guarantee funds are
not available.
4. Permit, under some circumstances, the state insurance
commissioner to examine the RRG's financial condition.
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3906 (1994).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 3901(a)(4)-(6).
55. See Maureen A. Sanders, Risk Retention Groups: Who's Sorry Now?, 17 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 531, 535-36 (1993).
56. See Susanne Scalfane, NRRA, La. Battle Over RRG Rules, NAT'L UNDER-
WRITER, PROPERTY & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. ED., Mar. 19, 1996, at 4
(United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana granted a tempo-
rary restraining order prohibiting Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance from enforc-
ing its new $5 million minimum capital and surplus requirements on RRGs).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 3902(a)(1).
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5. In federal court, assert that an RRG is in "hazardous fi-
nancial condition. 5 8
The cost of forming an RRG can be significantly higher than
forming an offshore captive, depending on the minimum capital-
ization requirements, feasibility studies, legal fees, and disclo-
sure requirements to avoid anti-fraud provisions of state
securities laws. But if the captive wants to sell insurance in
states other than the state in which it is domiciled, then the cap-
tive (unlike the RRG) may also have to comply with all the li-
censing and regulatory rules within each state in which it intends
to do business. 59 There has been a substantial amount of litiga-
tion regarding the authority of a state, other than the state in
which the RRG is domiciled, to regulate the RRG.60 Although
there are a number of ambiguities with respect to the Risk Re-
tention Act of 1986, an RRG is far better suited for a national
liability insurance program than an unfronted offshore captive.
The Liability Risk Retention Act also authorizes the forma-
tion of RPGs. Here the states have been given much greater
authority to regulate RPGs. The Act allows states to enforce
their laws that are not specifically exempted by the Act.6' In
Florida Department of Insurance v. National Amusement
Purchasing Group, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that the Lia-
bility Risk Retention Act does not "exempt purchasing group
insurers from being licensed or otherwise authorized in the state
where a purchasing group member resides. '62 In Swanco Insur-
ance Co.-Arizona v. Hager,63 the Eighth Circuit held that the
Iowa Commissioner of Insurance could impose its licensing re-
quirements upon an Arizona insurance company providing cov-
erage to an RPG domiciled in Arizona but having members in
Iowa. In Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Corcoran,64 the Sec-
ond Circuit held that Pennsylvania could apply its regulations
relative to insurance policy forms and rates to RPGs. The bot-
tom line is that an RPG provides some, but not complete, relief
from state regulation.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 3902(a)(1)(E).
59. Sanders, supra note 55, at 536-37.
60. See, e.g., National Home Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 444 S.E.2d 711 (Va.
1994).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 3903(g).
62. 905 F.2d 361, 365 (11th Cir. 1990).
63. 879 F.2d 353, 359 (8th Cir. 1989).
64. 850 F.2d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1988).
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State insurance laws usually define the conduct of insurance
business broadly in terms of acts that may be conducted in the
state only by a company licensed to conduct insurance business
within the state. Typically, the acts that can only be conducted
by a licensed insurance company include underwriting, negotiat-
ing, and issuing policies within the state.
When an insured within a state contracts with a company that
is licensed within that state, the premiums paid to the licensed
company are subject to state premium taxes.65 There are some
exceptions that allow an insured within a state to contract with
insurers that are not licensed in the state. For example, states
allow exceptions for insurance companies not licensed within a
state to transact "surplus lines" business. 66 The insured can only
place insurance through a broker with an insurer not licensed
within the state if, after due diligence, it is determined that the
insured cannot obtain the particular coverage from a licensed
insurer within the state. The surplus lines premium tax is usu-
ally paid by the insured and turned over to the state by the li-
censed surplus lines broker. A surplus lines company normally
must meet minimum capitalization requirements and will be
regulated to a limited extent by state law.
A second exception to the requirement that an insurance
company cannot conduct business in the state (including under-
writing and issuing policies) without being licensed within the
state applies to self-procurement transactions. Self-procure-
ment transaction exceptions often apply to single-parent (as op-
posed to group) captives. The captive will usually be considered
an unlicensed company if it is not domiciled in the same state as
the insured. The state laws in this area vary and should be
closely examined. Generally, state laws require the following:
1. The transactions must be reported and the premium tax
paid.
2. The negotiation and delivery of the policy and the pay-
ment of the premium must occur outside of the insured state.
3. The negotiations should not be conducted by mail or tele-
phone from within the state, and insurance agents or brokers
should not be involved in the transaction.
65. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 8551 (1991 & Supp. 1995). Direct premiums
of a captive insurance company are taxed at a higher rate than reinsurance premiums.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 6014 (1993 & Supp. 1995).
66. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3368 (1993).
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Depending on the state, the practitioner should look closely
to the state law and the applicable statutes.67 Historically, own-
ers of captives have not usually reported or paid premium taxes
for the following reasons:
1. Regulators, up to now, have not strictly enforced the
statutes.
2. The rationale for a premium tax is to pay for regulation
and protection. Captives generally are not regulated and do not
need the protection.
3. Contributions to a self-insurance fund are not insurance
premiums.
4. All activities of insurance take place outside of the state.
Certainly, some states make the formation of captives attrac-
tive. However, as stated above, offshore sites provide unique
opportunities for those wishing to take advantage of the captive
option.
B. Offshore Domicile
The most popular offshore jurisdictions for captives generally
are Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Barbados, the Bahamas, the
Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, and Ireland. In addition to the
less stringent regulations they impose, these domiciles have ex-
isted for a long time and have developed an infrastructure that
leads to predictability.
A 1995 report of medical malpractice insurance company cap-
tives shows that the Cayman Islands maintains 132 of the 236
reported captives, followed by Bermuda with 67, and Barbados
with 19. The other jurisdictions, Europe, the British Virgin Is-
lands, British Columbia, Australia, and the Bahamas, rank only
in the single digits.68
In addition to the tax and regulatory benefits listed above, off-
shore domiciles do not limit the type of coverage that a captive
can write. Nor do offshore domiciles regulate the amount of the
premiums that can be charged to members. This can result in
significant cost savings for the captive. Captives formed off-
shore, unlike RRGs and RPGs, are not limited to writing liabil-
67. For example, specific self-procurement taxes or industrial insured exemptions
issues may arise. See, e.g., Ruling of R. Gary Clark, Tax Admin., R.I. Div. of Taxa-
tion, No. 94-21, Aug. 3, 1994, 1994 WL 415239.
68. Johnson & Higgins, Address at meeting held in the Cayman Islands (Dec.
1995) (on file with the Annals of Health Law). See also CAPTIVE INS. Co. REP., supra
note 51.
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ity insurance. They can write additional lines of coverage such
as workers' compensation if the coverage is fronted by an admit-
ted carrier.
In the two most popular offshore domiciles for captives, the
Cayman Islands and Bermuda, the minimum capitalization re-
quirement is $120,000 in United States currency.69 This mini-
mum requirement can help overcome what may be the greatest
obstacle to successfully forming or operating a captive: the in-
ability to raise sufficient capital. However, captives normally
should be formed with capitalization well in excess of the mini-
mum requirements. In addition to the minimum capitalization
requirements, most offshore domiciles also require a sufficient
premium to surplus/capital ratio. For example, the insurance
regulators in the Cayman Islands prefer that the captive calcu-
late a capitalization figure that reflects the volume of the cap-
tive's business, its exposure to risks, its pay-out patterns, and its
obligations under fronting and reinsurance agreements. 70 The
regulators suggest that the premium-to-surplus (in other words,
capital) ratio be at least three to one, and it is extremely unlikely
that the Cayman Islands will license a captive with a premium-
to-surplus ratio above five to one.7 ' Some offshore jurisdictions
require that the capital be at least five times the exposure to any
single retained risk. In contrast, most state statutes require that
capitalization be at least ten times the exposure to any single
retained risk.
The first health care captive-started by Harvard University
in the 1970's-was originally to be domiciled in Bermuda.
However, Bermuda regulators resisted the captive's formation
because of a fear of physician malpractice risk. So the captive
was domiciled in the Cayman Islands. Beginning with the
Harvard captive, the Cayman Islands has been the domicile of
choice for many other health care captives. While Bermuda has
become more flexible and many health care captives are now
69. Michael Schachner, Cayman Copes with Soft Market; Slow, Steady Growth is
Target Until Insurance Rates Harden, Bus. INS., Apr. 30, 1990, at 64 (Cayman Islands);
Susanne Sclafane, Malone & Hyde Dims Deduction Hopes, NAT'L UNDERWRITER,
PROPERTY & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS Momr. ED., Mar. 18, 1996, at 9
(Bermuda).
70. John E. Darwood, Head, Ins. Section, Cayman Islands Fim. Serv. Supervision
Dep't, Health Care Sponsored Captives: Cayman Keys to Successful Captive Opera-
tions, at 6-7 (presented at the Cayman Islands on Nov. 30, 1995) (on file with the
Annals of Health Law); Schachner, supra note 69.
71. Michael Bradford, Cayman Fees for Captives Unchanged, Bus. INS., Apr. 10,
1989, at 68.
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domiciled there, the Cayman Islands regulators are quite recep-
tive to captives insuring physicians. 72
IV. TYPES OF CAPTIVES
When deciding whether and how to form a captive, health
care providers and their attorneys have several options, which
provide different benefits depending on the particular character-
istics of the provider.
A captive can be set up as a direct writing captive, or the cap-
tive can use a fronting company (an insurance company licensed
to provide insurance in the United States). If a captive operates
through a fronting company, the fronting company issues the
malpractice insurance policy to the provider and the captive as-
sumes a portion of the risk through its reinsurance agreement
with the fronting company. Use of a fronting company will in-
crease costs because the fronting company will receive a portion
of the premiums in exchange for the use of its license and for
accepting some of the risk. The captive will also be relinquish-
ing some measure of control to the fronting company.
However, there are some cost advantages to using a fronting
company. The federal excise tax is only one percent of the pre-
mium when a fronting company is involved,73 while the federal
excise tax is four percent of the premium when the offshore cap-
tive directly issues insurance.74 Physicians often prefer fronting
companies because (1) they feel secure knowing that the insur-
ance company is regulated within the United States (and thus
has a strong rating), and (2) if the insurance company fails, they
will usually be protected by the state's guaranty fund.
Captives are often formed by large tax-exempt health sys-
tems. In today's rapidly changing health care environment,
health care systems are looking at creative ways to gain an ad-
vantage. A captive can provide specialized coverage, such as
managed care coverage, that may not always be available or af-
fordable in the commercial marketplace. In addition, health
care systems often attempt to find ways to add value to their
health system by attracting affiliated physicians. Through cap-
tives, health care systems can often offer reduced premium rates
for both employee and independent contractor physicians. A
72. See Hospital Forms Captive for Malpractice Cover, Bus. INs., Feb. 15, 1988, at
63.
73. 26 U.S.C. § 4371(3)(1994).
74. Id. at § 4371(1).
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danger area for tax-exempt health care systems is unrelated
business taxable income, which, if substantial, could jeopardize
the system's tax-exempt status. Offshore captive income is not
usually subject to unrelated business taxable income,75 but
changes currently proposed in the 1996 tax bill may change that.
Many health care systems are trying to find ways to develop
affiliations with independent physicians. Some health care sys-
tems have discovered that they can reduce premiums for physi-
cians as well as increase physician loyalty by using captives. If
the physicians are employees of the health care system, cover-
age can be provided directly by the captive. If the physicians are
not employees of the health care system, there are two legal
problems to be addressed. First, physicians may have contrac-
tual obligations (perhaps with an outside hospital) that require
them to carry professional liability insurance from a licensed or
admitted carrier. Second, a captive generally cannot directly so-
licit business insurance in the United States without violating
state insurance laws.
There are two possible solutions to these problems. The first
is to use a fronting company to provide coverage to the physi-
cians. The fronting company will reinsure some of the risk with
the captive. However, as stated above, the use of the fronting
company will increase the costs of providing insurance. The sec-
ond possible solution is to form an RRG, discussed earlier,
under the Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986. The health care
system must carefully and closely consider these two alterna-
tives when evaluating the feasibility of providing insurance to
independent contractor physicians through the use of a captive.
VI. OTHER COVERAGE FOR THE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER
One of the principal advantages to setting up an offshore cap-
tive is that the captive can provide very flexible insurance cover-
age. A captive can handle risks throughout a health care
system. Many health care systems are currently involved in phy-
sician hospital organizations (PHOs), managed care organiza-
tions (MCOs), management service organizations (MSOs), joint
ventures, and other collaborations. Under certain circum-
stances, a captive may be able to write insurance to provide
managed care "capitation" risk coverage, as well as traditional
75. Eric T. Laity, Defining the Passive Income of Controlled Foreign Corporations,
21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 293 (1996). See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-07-007 (Nov.
12, 1993).
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malpractice insurance coverage, for these organizations. The
legal structures now found in the health care industry, including
PHOs, MSOs, and MCOs, present unique risks that may be-
come uninsurable in the traditional insurance market. Even if
these new health care structures can be insured in the commer-
cial market, the premiums may be extremely high because the
underwriters are uncertain about what they are insuring. In
many of these ventures, the health care entity can be a provider,
supplier, customer, and insurer all at the same time. Captives
can usually manage the risk for these ventures and reduce costs
far better than can commercial insurance companies.
In addition to managed care coverage, a captive can provide
other traditional lines of insurance, including (1) provider stop-
loss insurance; (2) workers' compensation insurance; (3) general
liability insurance; (4) environmental liability insurance; (5) auto
and property insurance; (6) directors and officers insurance; and
(7) errors and omissions insurance.
VII. CAREFUL SELECTION OF A CAPTIVE MANAGEMENT
CONSULTANT: DUE DILIGENCE
Normally an entity that is considering the captive alternative
must hire an insurance management consultant to assist both
with feasibility studies and, ultimately, in forming the captive.
Enter the captive insurance company manager, a burgeoning
field. A captive may hire an outside consultant, such as one of
the five largest-Johnson & Higgins/Unison, Marsh & McLen-
nan, Alexander & Alexander, ARM/IRM, or Sedgwick-or it
may self manage, which is growing in popularity.76 It is advisa-
ble to interview several managers prior to selecting a manage-
ment consultant.
The management consultant will assist the entity wishing to
form a captive and its legal representatives in preparing the ap-
plication for licensing in the domicile, as well as the other ad-
ministrative and legal needs. Often, the consultant will
recommend a legal representative if the owner does not already
have one. In conducting due diligence, the potential owner of
the captive should address each of the following with the pro-
spective consultant:
1. The expertise of the consultant in forming captive medical
malpractice insurance companies.
76. Largest Captive Managers, CAPTIVE INS. Co. REP., Sept. 1995, at 6.
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2. If the type of the potential captive is distinctive (such as a
jointly owned physician and hospital entity), the specific experi-
ence of the consultant in that area.
3. Names and addresses of references that can be contacted.
4. Estimates of the cost to conduct a feasibility study. (Fea-
sibility studies can be quite expensive, yet due diligence is
important.)
5. Specific information regarding the consultant's account-
ing procedures, including its ability to maintain financial state-
ments and management accounts, issue premium invoices, if
applicable, provide for the payment of claims and reinsurance
premiums, arrange for audits, prepare and file statutory returns,
provide for the administration of investment procedures, and
maintain accurate records of all financial transactions.
6. The actuarial expertise of the consultant in the area of
claims, either in house or through the use of competent outside
specialists.
7. The expertise of the consultant in the area of underwrit-
ing and arranging for reinsurance.
8. Specific pro forma financial information.
9. Specific information regarding the costs and fees paid to
the consultant for setting up the captive as well as running it on
an ongoing basis.
10. The consultant's willingness to allow the owner of the
captive to sever the relationship with the manager, in whole or
in part, after the captive is formed.
Once the captive is operational, the management company
and the board of directors will govern the captive. Most cap-
tives are managed by professional management companies that
employ a team of professionals (usually accountants) to provide
expertise in insurance underwriting, claims, reinsurance, financ-
ing, accounting, and legal matters. Depending on the level of
expertise of the entity forming the captive, some of these func-
tions may, over time, be performed in house, although counsel
must consider the various tax ramifications of an offshore man-
ager versus an in-house staff located in the United States.
CONCLUSION
The captive alternative for coverage of medical liability may
greatly benefit some health care providers. Pros and cons for
forming a captive exist for both tax-exempt and taxable entities.
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For tax-exempt health care entitites, the advantages of a captive
may, in many circumstances, outweigh the disadvantages. For
taxable entities, there are no tax savings at the federal level, but
forming a captive nevertheless may significantly reduce the cost
of providing insurance. The practitioner must address many is-
sues, which will differ with each sponsoring organization, and
consider the various available jurisdictions for a domicile. In
summary, any sizable health care entity should carefully con-
sider the possibility of setting up a captive.
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